JUNE 26 — Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s announcement of Malaysia’s interest in joining BRICS signifies the intent of shifting towards multipolarity, alongside the hedging of domestic interests between a Western-led economic order and the rising global influence of China.
Beyond the stances that Malaysians might take on BRICS, its future trajectory would remain relatively unchanged. Independent of BRICS participation, Malaysia is seeing increased use of the ringgit as a trading currency with its regional partners, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and China, in attempts to de-dollarize. It is also a voting member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the development bank deeply connected to BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB). The primary concern of BRICS critics stems from the fear of antagonising the West, which is antithetical to the idea of hedging interests. However, BRICS membership has shown little effect on bilateral relations between the USA and Brazil, South Africa, and India, all of which are core members of the organisation. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have indicated intent to collaborate with the NDB and BRICS through memoranda of understanding, notwithstanding that rising powers such as Brazil are focused more on reforming than entirely replacing the existing order.
If Malaysia’s direction remains the same regardless of BRICS, what is there to look out for? Three questions ought to be asked:
Firstly, how far is Malaysia willing to commit to further de-dollarization with other members? Most trade settlements in Ringgit are still centred around countries in the Indo-Pacific, where Malaysia has a greater degree of influence in maintaining the stability of trading currencies such as the baht and rupiah. However, the extension of de-dollarization within BRICS poses a concern for Malaysia: is the country capable of establishing the pre-requisite trust in the ringgit, and can trust be established for foreign currencies with high levels of fluctuation, such as the Russian rouble, Ethiopian birr, and Egyptian pound? Moreover, a majority of Malaysian trade is concentrated among non-BRICS members, which further signifies the inefficacies of BRICS as Malaysia’s tool towards de-dollarization.
Secondly, will reliance on BRICS create the same pitfalls Malaysia is trying to avoid? With the rising use of the renminbi (RMB) as an alternative to settle bilateral trade between states such as Brazil-Argentina, Russia-Pakistan, etc., one might foresee Malaysia adopting its use with other member states in search of stability in trade currency. Coupled with China’s substantial voting power in the AIIB (27%) and the NDB’s 55% quota allocated to the five founding members, it raises the question of whether the organisation is emulating the methods of consolidating influence from within, similar to how the US has done so with World Bank voting shares. Should Malaysia’s middle-income status and decreasing regional influence persist, its aim of independence within any rising order may be stunted by the reliance on BRICS as an escape chute.
Thirdly, how effective can this organisation be? Anwar’s comments on the “West controlling discourse” may be true with the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but the unity of the “Global South” may be distant from reality. BRICS members such as Iran and Saudi Arabia remain staunch adversaries in proxy conflicts over the Middle East, while China and India are still deadlocked over the Line of Actual Control. The integration of more diverse, multi-faceted nations with differing tensions highlights the impossibility of categorising middle powers into a monolith and inhibits the goal of BRICS in presenting a consensus-driven, unified geopolitical front.
Nonetheless, Malaysia can potentially benefit from BRICS as a platform to solidify its neutrality. Rather than relying on BRICS as the saving grace from Western hegemony in global organisations, Malaysia should wield it as a tool in the toolbox in striving for equitable distribution of influence in the World Bank and IMF. This warrants the empowerment of Malaysia’s trade capacity and the Ringgit’s strength as an alternative currency, as well as the re-emergence of Malaysia as a vital geopolitical actor in Asean and the greater Indo-Pacific, whether it be conflict mediation or the provision of humanitarian assistance. With the Asean Chairmanship belonging to Kuala Lumpur in 2025, Malaysia should seize the opportunity to regain its status as a regional leader as the foundational basis for operating within BRICS.
*This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
